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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER STATE CLAIMS TO
SHIPWRECKS: SHOULD THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT GO DOWN WITH THE SHIP?
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits citizens from bringing actions in law or
equity against individual states in federal courts. The Amendment does not address
whether states are subject to federal jurisdiction for actions in admiralty in which
both a shipwreck salvor and a state claim title to a shipwreck Analyzing applicable
admiralty, federal, and common law in the context of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, this Note examines whether the states are subject to pure admiralty
actions in federal court by citizen-salvors seeking either title to or reward for
salvaging a shipwreck. The original intentions of admiralty law: rewarding
salvors for their efforts, uniformity, and encouraging the recovery andpreservation
of shipwrecked property, are considered in answering this jurisdictional question.
The Eleventh Amendment remains afloat to protect states from some admiralty
actions, but there are circumstances in which federal courts should have
jurisdiction over citizens and states competing for claim to shipwrecks.
INTRODUCTION
This Note considers whether the Eleventh Amendment' protects a state from
being subject to a federal court'sjurisdiction in an admiralty in rem proceeding over
the right of salvage or title to a shipwreck. The Supreme Court recently examined
this question in California and State Land Commission v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.2
Deep Sea Research, Inc. filed an action in federal court asserting that it had found a
shipwreck in waters off the California coast.' Deep Sea Research claimed it had
purchased the rights to the vessel from some of the insurance companies that had
originally paid claims on the ship's cargo and that, under the rules of subrogation,
Deep Sea Research now held title to the vessel.4 Deep Sea Research argued, in the
alternative, that it should receive a salvage award based on its efforts to locate and
recover the vessel.'
The Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
2 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
See id at 494-96; see also Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan, 883 F.
Supp. 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
4 See id. at 496.
' Seeid.
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California claimed title to the vessel under either the Abandoned Shipwreck Act
of 1987 (ASA)6 or, if the ASA did not apply, a California statute that purportedly
conferred title to the state California argued that, by merely asserting a claim, a
state could invoke the Eleventh Amendment and deny the federal courtjurisdiction to
adjudicate California's claims of title to the vessel.'
This Note argues that the Eleventh Amendment is wholly inapplicable to pure
admiralty actions.' The Eleventh Amendment only protects a state from suits in law
or equity and from admiralty actions that closely resemble inpersonam or quasi in
rem common law actions." The Eleventh Amendment does not preclude federal
courts from adjudicating competing claims, including the claims ofa state, to the title
of a shipwreck.
Part I of this Note examines the basis for admiralty jurisdiction and continues
with a brief history of the development of some of the unique aspects of admiralty
law, including the laws of salvage and finds. Part II describes the origin of the
Eleventh Amendment and analyzes the application of the Amendment to both
admiralty and non-admiralty cases. Part III takes a closer look at Deep Sea and uses
post-Deep Sea cases to predict possible future trends. The conclusion provides a
brief summary of the competing interests and argues that those interests are best
served by an even application of admiralty principles.
I. ADMIRALTY
The United States Constitution states that the federal "judicial Power shall
extend ... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."" The Judiciary Act
of 1789 implemented the clause and vested exclusivejurisdiction of admiralty cases
in the federal courts of the United States. 2 The "Saving to Suitors" Clause of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 permits concurrent jurisdiction in state courts for remedies
available in the common law.'3 This clause allows state courts to exercisejurisdiction
6 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1994).
' See Deep Sea, 523 U.S. at 496; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6313 (West Supp.
1998).
8 See id. at 496-97.
9 For the purposes of this Note, a pure admiralty action is an action that is unique to
admiralty and has no remedy in law or equity.
'0 For a discussion regarding admiralty actions that closely resemble in personam or
quasi in rem common law actions, see infra notes 108-223 and accompanying text.
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
12 See-Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 7, 1 Stat. 73 (1789)."
'3 See id. § 9; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1994). Common law actions include
contract claims and tort actions that occur in a maritime setting. See GERARD J: MANGONE,
UNITED STATES ADMIRALTY LAW 65 (1997).
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in all areas in which the common law provides a remedy. 14 Inpersonam and quasi
in rem actions are known to the common law and can be pursued in state courts.
Courts, however, sitting in admiralty have created a number of unique institutions
that have no comparable common law actions." One such unique institution is the
in rem action.
An in rem action is a proceeding against the vessel itself. 6 The in rem action is
unique because it can convey to a party title to a vessel that is good against the whole
world. 7 State law attachments or foreclosure actions only"convey[] the defendant's
interest in the thing"' 8 and are not binding on parties not present in the proceeding. 9
Federal courts retain "exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over proceedings in rem"
because "the in rem action was not known to the common law."2° Admiralty
proceedings in federal courts are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and its Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) states that if a complaint has an admiralty
cause of action as well as an independent source of federal jurisdiction, the complaint
may include a statement invoking "an admiralty or maritime claim .... [However,
i]f the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for
those purposes whether so identified or not."22
The unique rules in admiralty proceedings are a result of the special
circumstances attendant in the maritime setting.23 The supplemental rules for
admiralty govern, inter alia, actions in rem.24 An in rem action is available to
enforce any maritime lien, or when otherwise authorized by statute.2" A maritime lien
can arise in any case in which a vessel's owner has failed to pay debts incurred by the
vessel.26. These debts can include "claims for injuries, wages, salvage, and other
14 See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, § 2-2 (2d ed. 1994).
15. See id
16 See id.
17 See id § 2-2, at 80 n.3. The in rem process is used to enforce a maritime lien. The
maritime lien is based on the legal fiction that the ship is a party to the action. This concept
allows a lien to attach without regard to who is in possession of the vessel. A lienholder can
institute an action and get title, even if the vessel is in the hands of a bona fide purchaser
acting in good faith. See id § 7-1, at 421-22 n. 1.
Is Id § 2-2, at 80 n.3.
'9 See D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 127 (1970).
20 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 2-2, at 80.
21 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).
' Id. This means that an action "cognizable only in admiralty" does not require a
statement invoking admiralty procedures. See id.
3 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 2-2, at 80 n.3 (explaining the need to adjudicate
title as to the world and not only between parties).
24 See FED. R. CIV. P., Supp. A(2).
25 See id Supp. C(1).
26 See MANGONE, supra note 13, at 59 (discussing the maritime lien and its uses). This
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products or services."27 The 1993 International Convention on Maritime Liens and
Mortgages currently dictates the priority of various types of liens, with salvage liens
taking priority over all claims other than those for the crew's wages and for loss of
life or personal injury.2" Salvage claims are prioritized in chronological order, with
the most recent salvage claim taking first priority.29
The admiralty in rem procedure is designed to protect maritime lienholders from
the danger of the vessel literally sailing away, hence avoiding its bills. The procedure
provides a method for arresting the vessel while a court determines the disposition of
the claim. The vessel's ownercan pay offthe lien and secure the release of his vessel,
or the court can order the vessel sold to pay off the liens.3"
The admiralty in rem proceeding begins when a creditor files a claim in admiralty
court asserting an interest in a vessel. The court then issues a warrant instructing a
U.S. Marshall to take possession of the vessel and to present it to the court for
disposition." The court then considers all of the competing claims to the arrested
vessel and rules accordingly. If the titleholders of the vessel cannot, or will not, pay
the judgment, the vessel is sold, and the proceeds are distributed to its creditors.32
Plaintiffs can use the admiralty in rem proceeding for a wide variety of claims,
including claims for payments for supplies, crew wages, wharfage fees, drydock
services, and maritime rescue.33 In addition, the in rein action is used to determine
the rights to a vessel claimed as a "prize" in time of war between sovereigns.34
Numerous Supreme Court cases have ruled that the United States, as a sovereign,
is not exempt from in rem judgments regarding cargo, damages, or suits in general
average,3" in cases in which normal shippers would be liable.36 The Court, however,
rests on the fiction that the vessel itself incurred the debt. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
27 MANGONE, supra note 13, at 59.
28 See May 6, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 353. Salvage claims are accorded such high priority
because, without the efforts of the salvor, there would be no vessel against which to bring
an action. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 7-6, at 448.
29 See MANGONE, supra note 13, at 59.
30 See id.
"' See Florida Dep't. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 678-80 (1982)
(describing the procedure for arresting the res in that case).
32 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 7-6, at 447.
13 See id § 7-6, at 447-48; supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 161-63 (1868) (determining the rightful
title of a vessel claimed as a prize during the Civil War).
" A suit in general average apportions a partial loss of the cargo among all shippers on
the vessel. It is an equitable principle used in situations in which one shipper's loss benefits
other shippers on the same voyage. It prevents a sole shipper from losing his entire cargo
while another shipper loses nothing, merely because of some twist of fate; a general average
suit apportions the loss so that all shippers are treated equally. See SCHOENBAUM, supra
note 14, §§ 15-1, 15-2, at 811-13.
36 See, e.g., The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 22 (1869) (finding no claim of sovereign
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in The Siren37 noted that this result is obtained only because the United States
Treasury is not invaded and, thus, the United States is not liable for any damages in
excess of the value of the arrested res. 8
Marine salvage is another area in which unique considerations require the
uniform application of in rem proceedings. The Law of Salvage developed as an
incentive for seamen to undertake voluntarily extraordinary measures to preserve life
and property at sea. 9 Its history dates as far back as 900 B.C. to the Rhodians, with
further development by the Romans, and later, the British.4" American courts, sitting
in admiralty, have long recognized the law of salvage.4
There are three prerequisites to a salvage claim:42 the rescue must be voluntary;
the salvage must be successful in whole or in part; and the vessel must be in danger
from a marine peril.43 The requirement that the rescue be voluntary precludes a hired
salvor from later discarding his contract and pursuing a salvage claim." Because
salvage is an equitable principle, a court will not grant an award if the rescue is either
wholly unsuccessful or unnecessary.45
Once a salvor demonstrates that he or she is eligible for an award, the court
considers numerous factors in determining the award amount.46 The basis of the
immunity where the marshal could attain possession of the res without "interfering with
any officer or agent of the government"); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868) (holding
that the United States could not assert sovereign immunity in order to protect the proceeds
of a prize sale from admiralty claims in court); United States v. Wilder, 28 F. Cas. 601
(C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16,694) (examining the history of sovereign immunity in
admiralty proceedings and finding no justification for a prerogative in either salvage or
general average proceedings in rem).
37 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868).
31 See id. at 154.
" See MANGONE, supra note 13, at 203-04 (outlining the history of the law of salvage).
40 See id. at 201-04.
41 See, e.g., Mason v. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804) (recognizing the
incentive effects of a large reward to salvors).
42 See MANGONE, supra note 13, at 210.
43 See id.; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 14-1, at 784.
44 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 14-1, at 785-86 (stating that even an oral
contract will preclude a salvor from recovering a salvage award). Similarly, anyone under
a duty to perform a rescue is not entitled to a salvage award. See id
45 See id. § 14-1, at 786. In treasure salvage cases, the most controversial element is
often that of marine peril. See id. Many courts will consider the possible loss of the wreck
through decay sufficiently perilous to support a salvage award. See id. § 14-1, at 785. In
Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d
330 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit held that "marine peril" included salvage of a ship
from the ocean bottom because the sea is capable of inflicting continuing damage through
erosion and wave action. See id. at 337; see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 14-1, at
784-86.
46 Courts typically weigh such factors as the degree of danger facing the property, the
value of the salvaged property, the risk incurred by the salvors, the salvors' skill and
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valuation is not quantum meruit, but rather more "akin to a bounty" for valiant
service."
Court awards typically have been very generous in order to encourage and
reinforce the incentive for salvors to undertake rescues despite the dangers and high
costs of these endeavors. Awards of fifty percent of the rescued property are
common, and, in some instances, awards have reached ninety percent.4"
One important facet of salvage law is that it does not convey title to the salvor.49
The law of salvage proceeds from the assumption that there is an owner who holds
title; the award to the salvor is simply payment for returning the property to its
owner.
50
The law of finds is closely related to the law of salvage, particularly in treasure
salvage cases." The main distinction is that the law of finds applies when the
property was intentionally abandoned with no intention, on the part of the original
energy, the value of the salvors' iquipment, the amount of risk of loss of such equipment,
and the time and labor expended in the operation. For a good discussion of the factors, see
Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 468 (4th
Cir. 1992) (citing The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869)); see also SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 14, § 14-1, at 790.
In deciding the salvage award for the salvors of the S.S. CentralAmerica, the court in
Columbus-America added a new element to the aforementioned factors. The court
considered the "degree to which the salvors have worked to protect the historical and
archeological value of the wreck and items salved." Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 468.
41 Sabrina L. McLaughlin, Roots, Relics and Recovery: What Went Wrong with the
Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 19 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 149, 163 (1995). In
Mason v. Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804), Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The allowance of a very ample compensation for those services, (one very much
exceeding the mere risk encountered, and labour employed in effecting them,)
is intended as an inducement to render them, which it is for the public interests,
and for the general interests of humanity, to hold forth to those who navigate
the ocean.
Id. at 266. The enhanced award is justified for public policy reasons as a way to encourage
salvors to take risks to save property. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 14-5. The award,
however, is limited to the value of the property salvaged and under normal circumstances
is capped at 50% of the rescued property. See id.
48 See, e.g., Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 467-68 (indicating that awards often
greatly exceed the costs of salvage and approach the total value of the find); see also
McLaughlin, supra note 47, at 160-67 (providing examples of awards).
"' See MANGONE, supra note 13, at 214.
50 See id.
" See McLaughlin, supra note 47, at 160.
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owner, to recover it." Although the law of finds is not exclusively an admiralty
remedy, it has, over time, developed its own special application in admiralty cases. 3
The law of finds is based on the common law precept of "finders keepers. 5 4 In
fact, this isa misnomer because rarely can a finder actually keep what he or she has
found." The basic doctrine dictates that the finder of an object holds title superior
to all except the original owner of the property in question. If no original owner
claims the property, the finder-can keep the title.56
A common law exception to the law of finds was the discovery of property
embedded in land. In that case, the found property was said to be in the constructive
possession of the landowner." The idea of constructive possession by the landowner
is not recognized in cases involving "treasure trove.""8 The treasure trove doctrine
applies when goods of antiquity, such as gold bullion or coins, are found in the land
of a third party. A finder of treasure trove has a claim subordinate to the original
owner, but superior to the landowner's claim.5
Because the law of finds is not strictly maritime law, it is possible to prosecute
such an action in a state court.6° Federal courts in admiralty, however, can still
assume original jurisdiction to make the initial decision regarding whether to apply
the pure admiralty action of salvage.6'
Once the admiralty court has jurisdiction over the case and invests the time
necessary to determine whether to apply the law of salvage or finds, the doctrine of
52 See id Courts in admiralty are reluctant to apply the law of finds because it
encourages finders to secret away discoveries in order to prevent the true owner from
claiming title. The law of salvage, on the other hand, promotes the recovery of property
and, because it is an equitable notion, ensures that the salvor will get a just and ample
reward for his efforts. See id. at 160-61; see also Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 460-65
(discussing the reluctance of courts in admiralty to apply the law of finds absent express
abandonment).
" See McLaughlin, supra note 47, at 163-65 (describing the common law doctrine of
finds and its special application in a marine setting).
54 See MANGONE, supra note 13, at 223.
" See id. at 223-24 (explaining that a finder can only keep the property if the rightful
owner is not known and does not assert a claim).
56 See id.
" This is the basis under which the United States claims title under the Abandoned
Shipwreck Act (ASA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1994), to the shipwreck and then transfers
that title to the states. See id The ASA defines embedded as "firmly affixed in the
submerged lands or in coralline formations such that the use of tools of excavation is
required in order to move the bottom sediments to gain access to the shipwreck, its cargo,
and any part thereof." 43 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
" See McLaughlin, supra note 47, at 163-64.
s9 See id
60 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
61 See id
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
judicial efficiency makes a strong policy argument in favor of allowing the court to
take the issue to final judgment.62
Admiralty courts do not use the doctrine of finds often because they rarely
consider an item to be abandoned by the original owner.63 Admiralty courts always
have required a showing of abandonment before applying the law of finds." An
express statement by the owner is usually necessary to demonstrate abandonment.65
Under some circumstances, however, courts have inferred abandonment "from lapse
of time and non-use of the property. 66 Abandonment in either case must be shown
by "clear and convincing" evidence.67
Congress has passed two statutes that, in varying degrees, allow states to claim
title to shipwrecks and attempt to prevent the application of either the law of salvage
or finds to treasure salvors' claims.
In 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), 6 giving states title
to the underwater lands and natural resources within three miles of their respective
coastlines.69 The purpose of the SLA was to allow the states to manage and develop
these underwater resources.7" In listing examples of what were considered natural
resources, the SLA notably omitted any mention of shipwrecks or other manmade
artifacts.7 Nonetheless, many states claimed title to wrecks under the SLA, arguing
62 It would waste valuable court resources to hear facts sufficient to determine whether
"finds" or "salvage" applied and then require a state court to rehear all of the evidence in
order to rule.
63 See, e.g., Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d
450, 460 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing the reluctance of admiralty courts to use the law of
finds).
64 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 14-7, at 798.
65 See id.; see also Sea Hunt Inc. v. The Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel, 47 F. Supp.
2d 678, 687 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that if the original owner appears, abandonment may
not be inferred, but must be proven by clear and convincing evidence).
6 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 14, § 14-7, at 799.
67 Id. § 14-7, at 799 n.23 (citing Columbus-America). In Columbus-America, the court
indicated that in almost all cases courts should use salvage law and that they only should
resort to finds law if there has been an express renunciation of ownership or no owner
claims title after the wreck has been discovered. See Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 464-
65. But see Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1978) (asserting that the application of the doctrine of salvage
law that presumes the existence of an owner of a "wrecked vessel whose very location has
been lost for centuries ... stretches a fiction to absurd lengths").
68 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1994).
69 See 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2).
70 See 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (a); see also McLaughlin, supra note 47, at 174.
7' Listed examples of natural resources included "oil, gas, minerals, fish, shrimp... and
other marine animal and plant life." 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e).
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that, under the law of finds, they were in constructive possession of all embedded
wrecks within three miles of their coastline.72
After asserting title to the wrecks, states invariably invoked the Eleventh
Amendment against any attempt by salvors to claim salvage for any wreck within
three miles of the coast.73 Some attempts by states to assert ownership were
successful,74 while others "founder[ed] on the shoals of Federal sovereignty.975
Congress, in an attempt to clear up the confusion regarding the SLA and
shipwrecks and to promote consistency in the way that shipwrecks were managed,
76
passed the Abandoned Shipwrecks Act of 1987 (ASA). 77 The bill's sponsors were
concerned with the preservation of historic shipwrecks and introduced the bill in the
hope that states would regulate and manage the discovery and preservation of historic
artifacts. 7
8
The ASA asserts that the United States claims title, as sovereign, to all
abandoned shipwrecks that are either embedded in the submerged lands of a state,
79
embedded in the coral formations of a state,"° or listed in the National Register of
Historic Places."' The ASA then transfers-titie of the specified shipwrecks to the
states in whose submerged land the wreck is embedded.82 It also directs the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior to promulgate non-binding guidelines for the states to
manage historic shipwrecks. 3
One of the most controversial features of the ASA is that shipwrecks covered
under it are not subject to the admiralty laws of salvage and finds." Congress was
712 See McLaughlin, supra note 47, at 174.
71 See id at 175.
74 See, e.g., Marx v. Guam, 866 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the SLA
provided Guam with a colorable claim and that, because of the Eleventh Amendment, the
court could not determine Guam's claims).
71 Commonwealth v. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc., 531 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Mass.
1988) (finding that the SLA did not act to convey non-natural resources to the states and
citing the passage of the then newly enacted Abandoned Shipwreck Act as evidence that the
earlier SLA had not transferred title to lost shipwrecks); see also Cobb Coin Co. v.
Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540, 549 (S.D. Fla.
1982) (holding that the SLA did not supercede general maritime law and therefore did not
grant Florida a claim to the vessel).
76 See Anne M. Cottrell, Comment, The Law of the Sea and International Marine
Archaeology: Abandoning Admiralty Law to Protect Historic Shipwrecks, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 667, 681 (1994).
71 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1994).
78 See 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (a); McLaughlin, supra note 47, at 182.
See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(1).
80 See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(2).
81 See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(3).
82 See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c).
83 See 43 U.S.C. § 2104.
8 See 43 U.S.C. § 2106.
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concerned that traditional rules of admiralty would compromise historical artifacts
found on covered shipwrecks."5 However, according to the Supreme Court's holding
in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson,6 Congress cannot entirely relinquish the federal
courts' constitutionally granted admiralty jurisdiction. 7 In Panama Railroad, the
Court set boundaries to Congress' regulation of the federal courts' admiralty
jurisdiction. First, the Court held that "the spirit and purpose" of the constitutional
provision assigning admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts mandates that any
regulation be "coextensive with and operate uniformly in the whole of the United
States.""8 Second, the Court held that there were certain boundaries to admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction that were well established by history, and that Congress could
neither exclude something clearly within this scope, nor include actions clearly
outside of it. 9 The ASA arguably violates both of these principles90
The ASA violates the uniformity principle because it allows and even encourages
states to implement their own programs regarding shipwrecks.9' The ASA provides
states with only non-binding suggestions on how to manage their individual shipwreck
programs.92 Furthermore, the Act encourages states to pass their own regulations
concerning salvage rights.93
The ASA violates the exclusivity principle because shipwrecks traditionally have
been considered within the legitimate domain of admiralty.94 Admiralty courts
consistently have found shipwrecks within theirjurisdiction.95 The ASA explicitly
states that the law of salvage and the law of finds do not apply to shipwrecks covered
85 See Cottrell, supra note 76, at 698 (discussing the legislative history of the ASA).
86 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
87 See id at 386-91.
8I Id at 386-87.
9 See id. at 386.
9 This Note outlines some of the constitutional arguments surrounding the ASA but
does not purport to give them complete coverage. Even assuming that the ASA is
constitutional in abrogating the applicability of admiralty law to wrecks covered under the
ASA, the determination of whether a shipwreck is covered should be considered within
admiralty law. This Note argues that a state cannot escape federal admiralty jurisdiction by
making the bald assertion that it holds title under the ASA. For more arguments regarding
the constitutionality of the ASA, see Denise B. Feingold, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of
1987: Navigating Turbulent Constitutional Waters?, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 361
(1990).
9' See Panama R.R., 264 U.S. at 392 (discussing the need for uniformity).
9 See Feingold, supra note 90, at 396.
93 See id at 395-96.
' See, e.g., Houseman v. The Schooner North Carolina, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 40 (1841)
(stating that no court could have jurisdiction over shipwrecks other than a court in
admiralty).
" See, e.g., Zychv. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel Believed to be the
"Seabird," 941 F.2d 525, 528-30 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing jurisdiction of admiralty courts
over wrecks).
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by the Act." Because the law of salvage is an action unique to admiralty, it would
seem that the ASA is a clear violation of the Panama Railroad principle.
It could be argued that the ASA applies only to vessels that are embedded in the
state's land. Therefore, the law of finds, which is not an exclusive admiralty action,
applies rather than the law of salvage.9" The first difficulty with this argument is
that, in order to use the law of finds, a court must determine that the shipwreck is
abandoned.9" The second is that the ASA covers ships "eligible" for inclusion in the
Federal Register of Historic Shipwrecks, whether or not these ships are
"embedded."" If a wreck is not embedded, the rationale behind the state's assertion
of title evaporates. The law of finds only grants title to a landowner if the found
property was embedded in his land.°° A court must make a threshold determination
regarding abandonment and embedment in orderto determine which law applies. The
determination of whether a vessel has been abandoned and whether it is embedded is
squarely within traditional admiralty jurisdiction.' 0 1
The Supreme Court, in Deep Sea, explained that the term abandonment in the
ASA retained its historical meaning under the principles of admiralty law.'0 2 This
clarification was crucial because of the special meaning of abandonment in admiralty.
Abandonment in admiralty requires that there be some affirmative action on the part
of an owner to relinquish ownership in the property.1
0 3
In some circumstances, abandonment can be inferred from such factors as the
passage of time and the lack of any action to attempt recovery.' °4 Courts in
admiralty, however, are extremely reluctant to find abandonment and have found non-
abandonment even when ships have been lost for hundreds of years with no attempt
at salvage. 5 Particularly in cases in which new technology has recovered a vessel,
96 See 43 U.S.C. § 2016 (1994).
9' See Peter Tomlinson, Full Fathom Five: Legal Hurdles to Treasure, 42 EMORY L.J.
1099 (1993) (discussing the historical application of both principles).
" Admiralty courts will apply the law of finds only if there is clear and convincing
evidence of abandonment. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(3).
o See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel Believed to be the
"Seabird," 941 F.2d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing the assertion that admiralty
jurisdiction over shipwrecks was "unquestioned before passage of the ASA").
'02 See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 508 (1998) (clarifying that
"the meaning of 'abandoned' under the ASA conforms with its meaning under admiralty
law").
103 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
0 The Court in Deep Sea struggled, in vain, to define a more certain indicator of
abandonment. One Justice humorously suggested, during oral arguments, using "lives in
being plus 21 years" as the time limit to assert a claim. U.S. Supreme Court Official
Transcript at *33, Deep Sea (No. 96-1400), available in 1997 WL 751917.
'o' See, e.g., Columbus-America Discovery v. Atlantic Mut. Ins., 974 F.2d 450, 467-68
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earlier attempts at recovery are often deemed not made because they were not
sufficiently likely to succeed."0 6
It is important that even in these cases, abandonment is only presumed, and can
be rebutted if an owner simply shows up and makes a claim stating that he or she had
no intent to abandon. 7 Therefore, it is appropriate to allow federal courts to
entertain the original action to preclude necessitating removal if an owner appears at
any time during the process to assert a claim.
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Eleventh Amendment Generally
Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment in direct response to Chisholm v.
Georgia,'"8 which held that a state could be sued in federal court by a citizen of
another state.'09 The holding in that case outraged citizens and Congress alike."' In
response, Congress drafted the Eleventh Amendment and, in 1795, the states ratified
it."' The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."'" 2
Hans v. Louisiana13 clarified both the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the
nature of the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution in suits between states and
(4th Cir. 1992) (finding non-abandonment despite 130 years of nonuse); Sea Hunt v.
Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel, 47 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding the Spanish
vessel Juno not abandoned after being lost at sea for almost two hundred years). The court
in Sea Hunt also adjudicated the rights to another vessel, the La Galga. The court held that
the La Galga, shipwrecked in 1750, had been expressly abandoned by Spain's adoption of
the Definitive Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain, and Spain on February 10,
1763. See id at 688-90; see also Definitive Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain
and Spain, Feb. 10, 1763, 278 Parry's Consol. T.S. 279. The treaty granted Britain "'all
that Spain possesses on the continent of North America."' Sea Hunt, 47 F. Supp 2d. at 689
(quoting 1763 Treaty, art. XX).
'o See Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 463.
'07 See id. at 464-65 (finding that an inference of abandonment with respect to an ancient
shipwreck "would be improper.., should a previous owner appear and assert his ownership
interest"); see also Sea Hunt, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 688 (agreeing with Columbus-America that
inferring abandonment would be improper if a previous owner asserted his interest).
108 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
'09 See id. at 420-24.
"o See David J. Bederman, Admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment, 72 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 935, 952-54 (1997).
See id at 935, 954-57.
"z U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
"1 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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citizens.' 4 Hans was an action against the State of Louisiana, filed by one of its own
citizens, to recover interest on bonds issued by the state.' Hans contended that, as
a citizen of the State of Louisiana, he was not subject to the restrictions of the
Eleventh Amendment; therefore, he was free to institute an action against the state. 6
In rejecting Hans' claim, the Court explained that the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to be merely an extension of the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity."' The language of the amendment states that the judicial power should
not be considered to "extendto any suit in law or equity,""' 8 meaning that the judicial
power under Article III should not grant any additional jurisdiction that was otherwise
not available in law or equity." 9 In other words, the sovereign immunity of a state
from its own citizens was already recognized, and the Eleventh Amendment merely
clarified that Article III should not be interpreted as changing that immunity merely
because the citizen in question was from another state. 2° Therefore, Hans, who was
filing an action against his own state of Louisiana, was wholly unaffected by the
Amendment and was instead subject to the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity. However, there were certain actions that were recognized historically as
acceptable, despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 2
One exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine, recognized by the Court in
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick Railroad Co.,'22 is the instance when property
belonging to the state, or in which the state claims an interest, "comes before the
court and under its control, in the regular course ofjudicial administration, without
being forcibly taken from the possession of the government."'2 In such an action, a
114 See id.
" See id at 1. Hans' claim concerned federal laws, which put his action within the
jurisdiction of the federal court, which extends, according to Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, to all cases involving the Constitution and the laws of the United States. See
id at 9; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
116 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. Hans relied on the literal text of the Amendment, which
applies to "Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
117 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-13.
118 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
l19 "[I]t was not the intention [of the Eleventh Amendment] to create new and unheard
of remedies .... ." Hans, 134 U.S. at 12 (citing Justice Iredell's dissenting opinion in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 429 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting)). Justice
Iredell's dissent in Chisholm largely supplied the basis for the Eleventh Amendment. See
Hans, 134 U.S. at 12, 14.
120 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-15 (articulating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
protected Louisiana from suit by its own citizens, like Hans, and that the Eleventh
Amendment did not change that fact).
121 See Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883)
(discussing three common exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
122 109 U.S. 446 (1883).
123 Id. at 451.
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federal court will "proceed to discharge its duty"'24 and determine the rightful
titleholder. Another exception is when a person is sued in tort and claims as a defense
that he was acting under the orders of the government.12 5 The court's jurisdiction is
not removed until the defendant shows that his authority from the government is
sufficient to protect him at law. 26 The third exception is the writ of mandamus,
whereby a purely ministerial action of a government official can be commanded by
the court once the party requesting the writ can demonstrate that the government
official may not exercise discretion in the performance of his or her duty. 27
B. Eleventh Amendment Application in Admiralty
The Eleventh Amendment is quite specific in its language and, textually, only
applies to suits in law or equity.12  The Framers of the Constitution and of the
Eleventh Amendment were well-versed in legal language and in the important
distinctions between different actions.129 If the Framers intended the Amendment to
apply to admiralty, they could have manifested that intention clearly in its language.
In fact, early jurisprudence indicated that the understanding at the time was that the
Eleventh Amendment did not apply to admiralty actions in which a state was a
party. 3 ° As time passed, the distinction was lost and the Supreme Court held in
certain cases that the Eleventh Amendment did apply to certain actions in
admiralty.'
Some commentators have argued that the Court should reexamine its position on
this issue and return to the original understanding of the Amendment's Framers.3 2
124 Id.
121 See id at 452.
126 See id
127 See id at 452-53; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
128 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("Judicial power ... shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity .... ").
129 The Framers made a distinction between law and equity when necessary and granted
jury trials as a right in law but not in equity. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (granting a jury
to suits at common law). The Seventh Amendment has been interpreted so as not to confer
a right to a jury in an equitable action. See, e.g., Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 297
F. Supp. 485 (D. Minn. 1969). Nor does the Seventh Amendment apply to suits in
admiralty. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e) (denying a right to a jury for admiralty or maritime
claims).
130 See infra notes 137-69 and accompanying text.
... See infra notes 170-223 and accompanying text.
132 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than
a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983). This particularly
persuasive article was recognized by the Court in Deep Sea. See California v. Deep Sea
Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 510 n.* (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Until recently, this line of thought was rarely pursued outside of purely academic
circles. However, with its decision in Deep Sea, the Court indicated its willingness
to reconsider the issue, at least to some extent.
The Court in Deep Sea did not overrule any of its prior holdings; rather, its
holding was contingent on the fact that the state did not have possession of the item
in question, thereby giving the federal courts jurisdiction in admiralty. 33 The Deep
Sea holding, however, left two important questions unanswered. First, Deep Sea did
not determine what type of possession is necessary. The justices spent some time in
oral arguments attempting to discern what actions a state would have to take to be
considered "in possession" ofa wreck."U Second, the Court did not indicate whether
the relevant distinction in determining the possession of a wreck by the state is
between "permissible admiralty" and "non-permissible admiralty" suits, or whether
possession is merely a factor... in some other dispositive characteristic.36
In attempting to answer these questions, it is important to review the background
of in rem admiralty cases in the United States.- One of the most controversial early
admiralty cases was UnitedStates v. Judge Peters.37 Judge Peters concerned a writ
of mandamus issued against Judge Peters, ajudge of the-District Court of the United
States for the District of Pennsylvania, after he refused to enforce ajudgment of the
' See Deep Sea, 523 U.S. at 507-08.
'34 The oral argument demonstrated an attempt by the Justices to focus the distinction:
Question: [I]f states want to get control of these abandoned vessels [should
they] send the local police out in the appropriate vessels and just take
possession... ?
Question: [What] if they had located them, and sent a diver down affixing a
sign saying, claimed by the State, that would be enough for the possession rule,
would it?
Question: Well maybe it doesn't have to send a diver down. It could just go
and drop a big rock ... that says the State owns this ....
Question: What about putting a buoy, as divers often do... ?
Question: I thought possession and assertion of ownership are two different
things.
U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript at **35-38, Deep Sea (No. 96-1400), available in
1997 WL 751917.
' One such factor might be whether the action would remove assets from the state's
treasury or whether the assets were in the service of the state.
136 Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in a concurring opinion questioning
whether possession was the relevant distinction. See Deep Sea, 523 U.S. at 510 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
117 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 115 (1809).
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federal court in favor of Gideon Olmstead and others.'38 Judge Peters' reluctance
stemmed from an order issued by the Pennsylvania legislature directing the Governor
to "call out an armed force to prevent the execution of any process to enforce" the
judgment.'39
The underlying action of Judge Peters was founded in an admiralty proceeding
instituted by Olmstead and his companions. 40 A British vessel had captured
Olmstead and his companions during the Revolutionary War and impressed them into
service.' 4' Later Olmstead and others overwhelmed the captain and crew ofthe vessel
and proceeded to take it to Pennsylvania as a prize of war. 4 '
When in sight of Egg Harbor, New Jersey, Olmstead and his companions were
pursued and captured by the armed brig Convention, which was owned by
Pennsylvania.' Upon arrival at the Port of Philadelphia, Olmstead instituted an
action to recover a prize.'14 The State of Pennsylvania also entered the action,
claiming the vessel as its prize.
45
The state trial court awarded one fourth of the vessel's value to Olmstead, with
the balance divided among Pennsylvania and the other claimants. 46 Olmstead
appealed to the Court of Commissioners of Appeals in Prize Causes for the United
States of America and was awarded sole possession. ' Pennsylvania violated the
appellate court order by selling the vessel and distributing the proceeds to David
Rittenhouse, Treasurer of Pennsylvania. 4"
Judge Peters then ruled in an action to recover the balance from the Treasurer of
Pennsylvania. It was the enforcement ofthat ruling that the Pennsylvania legislature
ordered be resisted by force.1
4
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, held that the
appeals court was within its rightful power when it "extinguished the interest of the
State of Pennsylvania,"'' 0 thereby asserting that the rights of a state can be
138 See id. at 135.
139 Id at 115 n.*.
140 See id at 136-37.
141 See id at 119.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 A prize action is an in rem admiralty action in which the title to a vessel captured
during war is conveyed to the capturing party. See MANGONE, supra note 13, at 58.
141 See Judge Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 137.
146 See id. at 119 (dividing the residue "between the state and the owners of the privateer,
and the officers and crews of the Convention and Le Gerard [another vessel involved in the
capture]").
147 See id.
14s See id at 137-38.
149 See id at 139.
150 Id at 140.
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adjudicated in an in rem proceeding. '' Furthermore, the Court held that because the
property was not in the possession of the State itself,' but rather in the possession
ofDavid Rittenhouse's heirs, the State had no right to assert an Eleventh Amendment
privilege and to resist the legal process."
This holding stands ,for the proposition that federal courts have jurisdiction to
determine the relative rights of all parties, including a state, in an in rem
proceeding.'54 Judge Peters also held that a state cannot prevent the execution of a
federal warrant merely by asserting a claim to that property.'"
In The Davis,'56 Mr. Simeon Draper, a Treasury agent of the United States,
contracted with a vessel to deliver a shipment of cotton from Savannah to New
York.'7 En route, the vessel encountered a storm and would have been lost if not for
the "meritorious service of one Douglas." 58 Douglas delivered the vessel to New
York and, immediately upon arrival, instituted a libel action against the vessel.5 9 The
U.S. Marshalls arrested the vessel and delivered possession to the court for
disposition.O6O
The United States appeared and declared that its cotton could not be arrested and
that it could not be held liable for any award to Douglas.'6 ' The Court held that
proceedings inremto enforce liens against the United States were "only forbidden in
cases where, in order to sustain the proceeding, the possession of the United States
151 However, the Court explicitly withheld an opinion on whether it could have
adjudicated the state's interest in property that it had in its own possession. See id. at 139.
152 See id. at 141.
1 See id
114 See id. at 139.
The right of a state to assert, as plaintiff, any interest it may have in a subject,
which forms the matter of controversy between individuals, in one of the courts
of the United States, is not affected by [the Eleventh] Amendment; nor can it
be so construed as to oust the court of its jurisdiction, should such claim be
suggested.
Id. Despite the fact that this holding is more than 180 years old, it has never been explicitly
overruled in whole or in part. The holding seemingly was contradicted by the views
expressed by some Justices in Florida Dept. ofState v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670
(1982), in which they assumed that they did not have the power to decide the state's claim.
See id at 699-700; see also infra note 209 and accompanying text.
' See Judge Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 139.
156 77 U.S. 15 (10 Wall.) (1869).
' See id at 16.
15 Id.
9 See id A libel action was the initial pleading in an admiralty action that was
equivalent to a civil complaint. In 1966, the Supplemental Rules of Admiralty were
incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and actions are now commenced
through a complaint. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 632 (6th ed. abridged 1991).
"~ See The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 16.
161 See id.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
must be invaded under process of the court."'62 The Court asked, "But what shall
constitute a possession which, in reference to this matter, protects the goods from the
process of the court?"' 63 The Court answered the question by asserting that only
actual possession, not constructive possession, would suffice."
Constructive possession, or possession by implication, was not sufficient to
invoke sovereign immunity because it was possible to refute the implication without
attacking the physical possession of the government. 65 Determination of title to
property that is in the actual possession of the Court did not create "unseemly conflict
between the court and the other departments of the government."' 66
In The Davis, the marshall obtained possession without any contact with officers
of the United States.'67 The Court reasoned that because the United States was not
in possession of the goods when the action was instituted, the United States was
legitimately "reduced to the necessity of becoming claimant and actor in the court to
assert her claim."'68 In other words, a lien against the property of the United States
is "only forbidden in cases where, in order to sustain the proceeding, the possession
of the United States must be invaded under process of the court.'
' 69
The first cases widely regarded as applying the Eleventh Amendment to suits in
admiralty7 ' are the companion cases known as New York P171 and New York 1172
New York I involved an in rem action against tugboats owned by a company called
Fix Brothers for damages alleged to have been caused by the vessels. ' Fix Brothers
answered that, at the time of the alleged incident, the State of New York operated the
tugs; therefore, the state should answer for the damages. 74 New York appeared
162 Id. at 20.
163 Id. at 21.
'" See id. The Court required, for immunity, "a possession which can only be changed
under process of the court by bringing the officer of the court into collision with the officer
of the government, if the latter should choose to resist." Id. at 21.
16 See id
166 Id.
167 See id. at 22.
168 Id. It follows that, for purposes of immunity, states would hold no greater privilege
than the United States as a whole. The Supreme Court has "recognized a correlation
between sovereign immunity principles applicable to the States and the Federal
Government." California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 506-07 (1998).
l9 The Davis,,77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 20.
170 See, e.g., Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel Believed to be the
Lady Elgin, 960 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 1992) (arguing that a district court judgment
against Illinois' property interest in a sunken ship is contrary to the Eleventh Amendment).
"' Exparte State of New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) [hereinafter New York I].
17' Exparte State of New York, 256 U.S. 503 (1921) [hereinafter New York II].
7 See New York I, 256 U.S. at 495.
174 See id. Specifically the action was against Edward S. Walsh, Superintendent of Public
Works of the State of New York, as agent of the state. There was no charge that Walsh
acted in an unconstitutional manner in his operation of the tugs; therefore, the suit was one
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specially and suggested that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to proceed
against New York in the absence of the State's consent. 175
The Court held that "the immunity of a State from suit in personam in the
admiralty brought by a private person without its consent, is clear.' 76 Equally clear
is that New York I did not address the question of in rem admiralty jurisdiction
regarding ares that was properly in the possession of the court.'77 The res was in the
possession ofthe state and was being used for public purposes.77 Any award granted
to the plaintiff in the case would have been paid out of the Treasury of the State of
New York. 79 New Yorklneed not, in any way, rest on the operation of the Eleventh
Amendment; rather, it quite correctly recognized that nothing in the Constitution
changes admiralty law or the doctrine of sovereign immunity to allow inpersonam
suits against a sovereign without the sovereign's approval. 8 '
New York I8' was a true in rem action against the vessel Queen City, a tugboat
wholly owned and operated by the State of New York. The Court, citing The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,8 2 held that it could not adjudicate title with
respect to a sovereign state that was at peace with the United States. 3 New York II
recognized that numerous courts in admiralty had held that "property and revenue
necessary for the exercise of [governmental] powers are to be considered as part of
the machinery of government exempt from seizure and sale under process against the
city."'8 4 Further, the Court stated, "The principle so uniformly held to exempt the
brought by individuals against the State. See id at 502.
17. See id at 496.
176 Id. at 500.
,71 "[T]he proceedings against which prohibition is here asked have no element of a
proceeding in rem, and, are in the nature of an action in personam against Mr. Walsh, not
individually, but in his capacity as Superintendent of Public Works of the State of New
York." Id. at 501.
178 See id at 495-96.
179 See id. at 501-02 (citing the state statute authorizing such payments).
SO The Court agreed with Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), that the Eleventh
Amendment did not apply to in personam suits against a state by its citizens whether they
be in law, equity, or admiralty. See New York1, 256 U.S. at 498.
1' New York H was an action filed against the vessel in rem to recover damages
sustained through the death of Evelyn McGahan. See New York II, 256 U.S. 503, 508
(1921). This was different from New York I, in which the suit was filed against an official
of the State of New York. See New York , 256 U.S. at 494-96.
I2 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
183 See New York II, 256 U.S. at 510-11. The Schooner Exchange was an in rem
proceeding whereby crewmembers on board the Exchange challenged the title of the
Emperor Napoleon, who claimed the vessel as a prize of war. The vessel entered the
territory of the United States under peaceful circumstances. See The Schooner Exchange,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117.
I" New York II, 256 U.S. at 511 (citing primarily Long v. The Tampico, 16 F. 491
(D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1883); and citing secondarily The Protector, 20 F. 207 (C.C.D. Mass.
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property of municipal corporations employed for public and governmental purposes
from seizure by admiralty process in rem, applies with even greater force to exempt
public property of a State used and employed for public and governmental
purposes."185
The Court had an opportunity to consider the application of this doctrine in 1982
when Treasure Salvors, Inc. filed an admiralty in rem action seeking a declaration of
title to a shipwreck, presumed to be the Atocha, located off of the Florida Keys." 6
Certain portions of the vessel were in the possession of the Florida Division of
Archives.8 7 The district court issued a warrant for the arrest of the artifacts
possessed by the Division and ordered the artifacts delivered to the possession of the
court.18
The Division officials had obtained the artifacts under the terms of a contract
between the State of Florida and Treasure Salvors, Inc.8 9 The contract was entered
into after Florida threatened Mel Fisher, president of Treasure Salvors, with arrest
for commencing salvage operations without a permit from the state. 190 The contract
was predicated on the assumption that the artifacts were legally the property of
Florida under a statute that assumed title to all artifacts buried in Florida's lands.
91
The contract provided that Florida convey title of seventy-five percent of any
found treasure to Treasure Salvors in exchange for fees, a performance bond, and
excavation in a manner specified by the state. 92 After the contract was signed, there
was unconnected litigation between the United States and Florida concerning the
extent of Florida's boundaries in the underwater regions near the Florida Keys. 93
When that litigation was settled, the Atocha was found outside of territory controlled
by Florida.'94
1884); The F. C. Latrobe, 28 F. 377 (D.C. Md. 1886); The John McCraken, 145 F. 705 (D.
Or. 1906)).
... New York II, 256 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added). In rem proceedings involving
shipwrecks, in contrast, usually concern vessels whose existence was not even known to the
state prior to the claim. See, e.g., Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d
379, 382 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Until DSR discovered the wreck, neither the State nor anyone
else knew its location, and the State had not made any attempt to locate the wreck.");
Commonwealth v. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc., 531 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Mass. 1988)
("The Commonwealth was neither actively searching for nor aware of the location of the
wreck."). These wrecks are not used and employed for public and governmental purposes.
386 See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 673-74 (1982).
387 See id at 678.
188 See id. at 678 & n.10.
i89 See id at679n.1l.
'90 See id. at 674.
'9' See id. at 673-74 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.061(1)(b) (West 1974)).
9 See id at 675.
'9' See id. at 675-76 (citing United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975)).
' See id. at 676 (citing United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976)). As between the
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Treasure Salvors quickly instituted an action to claim title to the Atocha'95 The
United States intervened and claimed title under the doctrine of sovereign
prerogative. 196 The district court rejected the United States' claim and held that
"possession and title are rightfully conferred upon the finder of the res derelictae."'197
Treasure Salvors then instituted the action for the return of the artifacts it gave to the
officials at the Division of Artifacts.19
8
A plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens, framed three questions to decide
the case. First, Justice Stevens asked whether Treasure Salvors was asserting a claim
against the state or against the state officials.99 Next, he asked whether the conduct
of the officials constituted an unconstitutional withholding of property.2" Finally, he
asked whether the relief sought constituted -permissible prospective relief or
"'require[d] the payment of funds from the state treasury. ' ' ' 20 '
The plurality opinion held that the federal court had jurisdiction to compel the
arrest of the property from the possession of state officials because the officials had
no colorable claim to retain possession. 2 The officials lacked this basis because the
contract did not give the officials any authority to hold the artifacts. 203 Rather, the
contract gave Treasure Salvors the right to salvage items found on Florida's
property. 204 The contract did not expressly or impliedly transfer any rights from
Treasure Salvors to Florida.2 5
The Court applied doctrines enunciated in Tindal v. Wesley2°6 and United States
v. Lee.2°7 These cases held that the:
United States and Florida, "the United States was entitled to the lands, minerals and other
natural resources in the area in which the remains of the Atocha had come to rest." Id
'" See id. at 676 (citing Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 408 F.
Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976)).
'9' See Treasure Salvors, 408 F. Supp. at 909. Sovereign prerogative is an English
doctrine whereby the sovereign has the right to any property found by its citizens. See
Leanna Izuel, Comment, Property Owners' Constructive Possession of Treasure Trove:
Rethinking the Finders Keepers Rule, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1669 (1991).
197 Treasure Salvors, 408 F. Supp. at 911.
198 See id. at 678.
'99 See id at 683-85.
200 See id at 688-89.
20 Id. at 690 (quoting Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 (1979)).
202 See id at 694.
203 See id.
204 See id. The contract, by its terms, transferred Florida's rights in the property to
Treasure Salvors. However, since Florida had no rights to transfer, the contract had no
effect. In other words, the contract did not transfer any rights from Treasure Salvors to
Florida. See id.
205 See id.
206 167 U.S. 204 (1897).
207 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
settled doctrine of this court wholly precludes the idea that a suit against
individuals to recover possession of real property is a suit against the
State simply because the defendant holding possession happens to be an
officer of the State and asserts that he is lawfully in possession on its
behalf."' 8
Using this analysis, the Court sidestepped the Eleventh Amendment issue completely.
The plurality assumed that it could not decide the issue of the state's claims to title
but declined to broach the issue.2'
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. 10 He
agreed that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply, but for a different reason than the
plurality. He maintained that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to suits against
a state by citizens of the same state.2 '
Justice Brennan disagreed that the lower court erred in deciding the title issue vis-
d-vis the state's interest. Instead, he argued that the Supreme Court's holding that
the state officials had no colorable basis for a claim of ownership 2 precluded the
necessity of overturning the district court's determination of the state's interest.213
Justice White, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, concurred
in part and dissented in part. Justice White's opinion agreed with the plurality that
the court below erred in determining title vis-d-vis the state.2"4 He argued that the
plurality erred in its distinction regarding the state officials and in finding that the
contract failed to provide a "colorable claim."2"
The dissent favored having the state officials maintain possession of the artifacts
under the doctrine of the New York cases,"' whereby a state's assertion of title to
articles in its possession was enough to justify the application of the doctrine of
208 Tindal, 167 U.S. at 221.
209 See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 700. The Court did reverse the appellate court's
determination of the state's claim of ownership. See id.
210 See id (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21' Justice Brennan asserted that the Court in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)
(holding that a state cannot be sued by its own citizens), "did not rely upon the Eleventh
Amendment, and that the Amendment does not bar federal court suits against a State when
brought by its own citizens." Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 700-01, (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan adpopted the view, explained supra note
120 and accompanying text, that the Eleventh Amendment merely clarified that Article III
did not remove the sovereign immunity of a state when an action was brought by a citizen
of another state.
212 See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 694.
213 See id. at 701-02 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214 See id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215 See id at 703 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216 See New York I, 256 U.S. 490 (1921); New York II, 256 U.S. 503 (1921).
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sovereign immunity.217 The dissent thereby subtly expanded the holding of New York
II, which held that property in a state's possession and "used and employed for public
and governmental purposes" justified the application of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.218 Given that New YorkHwas already an extension from the original idea
of warships in government service," 9 it is not clear that this extension by the
Treasure Salvors dissent is warranted.220
The Court's fractured holding caused considerable confusion in the lower courts,
which struggled to apply Treasure Salvors to a variety of salvage cases. 22'
Particularly confusing was the "colorable claim" language in the Treasure Salvors
opinion. Lower courts often interpreted this to mean that a state needs to assert only
a colorable claim to possession to invoke the Eleventh Amendment.222 The Supreme
Court revisited the subject in 1998 with its decision in California v. Deep Sea
Research, Inc.223
III. DEEP SEA RESEARCH
In 1865, the Brother Jonathan sank offthe coast of California.24 Five insurance
companies maintained records indicating payment on losses incurred in the tragedy.225
It is unclear whether the vessel itself was covered by insurance or whether any other
claims were filed against the cargo.226 There is no evidence that any of the insurance
companies or the State of California ever actively searched for the vessel.227
In 1994, Deep Sea Research (DSR) discovered the wreck in approximately 200
feet of water off the coast of California.228 DSR filed an admiralty action seeking
27 See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 702.
218 New York11, 256 U.S. at 511.
219 See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
220 Florida could, perhaps, have argued that the artifacts were intended for public display
for educational reasons. This assertion would have put the artifacts in the state's possession
and in the service of the state. However, this is a factual question that was never addressed.
22 See, e.g., Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel Believed to be the
Lady Elgin, 960 F.2d 665,670 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the district court misunderstood
Treasure Salvors); Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel Believed to be
the Seabird, 941 F.2d 525, 534 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment issue
sidestepped by the Court in Treasure Salvors was central to Seabird).
222 See, e.g., California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491,497 (1998) (describing
the district court's holding as relying on California's failure to assert a colorable claim).
223 523 U.S. 491 (1998).




228 See id. at 496.
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either title to or a salvage award for the vessel and her contents. 229 DSR also asserted
a claim of ownership based on the purchase of subrogation rights from the vessel's
five known insurers.23° California moved to dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction, claiming that it possessed title to the vessel under the ASA and that the
action was against the state in violation of the Eleventh Amendment.23 ' The district
court concluded that the state failed to demonstrate that it had maintained a
"colorable claim" to the Brother Jonathan.2 2 The court held that the state had not
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the vessel was abandoned,
embedded, or eligible for inclusion in the national register as required by the ASA.233
The district court appointed DSR as exclusive salvor, pending the court's
disposition of the items recovered or the proceeds therefrom.23" The district court
declined to find any particular portions of the wreck as abandoned or non-
abandoned.235 California appealed, arguing that it was not required to establish "by
a preponderance of the evidence" that it had title to the wreck.236 California argued
that it was sufficient for it to show that it had a colorable claim.237
The Supreme Court's majority opinion recognized that the court had not "charted
a clear path in explaining the interaction between the Eleventh Amendment and the
federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdiction. 2 3' The Court held that the district court
could adjudicate the state's title and decide whether the ASA applied to the Brother
Jonathan.239 The majority did not overrule Treasure Salvors, but expressly limited
that decision to its facts. 24° The Court also distanced itself from its dicta in Treasure
Salvors, in which it assumed it did not have jurisdiction to decide Florida's title. 24'
Rather than overturning some of its earlier opinions, the majority based its holding
on the distinction that the State of California was not in possession of the vessel;
therefore, the in rem proceeding was not "against the state.' 242
229 See id. at 496-97; see also Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp.
1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
230 See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 496.
231 See id. at 496-97.
232 See id at 497.
233 See id. Subsequent to the filing of the claim, the vessel was deemed eligible for
inclusion in the National Register. See id. at 498.
234 See id. at 497.
235 See id. at 499-500 (citing Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d
379, 389 (9th Cir. 1996)).
236 Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 504.
237 See id
238 Id. at 502.
239 See id at 508.
240 See id at 505 (pointing out that, in Treasure Salvors, the state had actual possession
of the artifacts that were subject to the suit).
241 See id at 504-07.
242 See id at 505.
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Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion expressing his belief that all eight
Justices, including himself, who, in Treasure Salvors, had believed that the Eleventh
Amendment applied to admiralty in rem actions were likely mistaken. Justice Stevens
wrote, "I am now persuaded that all of us might well have reached a different
conclusion if the position of Justices Story and Washington... had been brought to
our attention."
243
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in a concurring opinion stating
that the majority's discussion should not lead to the conclusion that the Court has
made a distinction based upon the state's possession or non-possession in analyzing
admiralty in rem actions.2" This concurring opinion closed with an invitation to
reconsider the issue.245
Although Deep Sea was decided only recently, it already has affected admiralty
in rem actions. Three months after the Supreme Court's decision in Deep Sea, the
Eleventh Circuit cited Deep Sea in ruling that the State of Florida was not immune
to a federal court's decision on whether to grant limitation of liability to a shipping
company. 46 Bouchard Transportation Co. had filed for limitation of liability, in
regards to an oil spill, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.247 Florida filed a motion
to dismiss, arguing that its claims could not be adjudicated in federal court without
its permission.2 4' The court held that the limitation of liability proceeding was
sufficiently analogous to a traditional maritime in rem proceeding to permit the
application of the Supreme Court's holding in Deep Sea.249
In another shipwreck case, the Sixth Circuit held that once Michigan had
demonstrated a colorable claim to the shipwreck, the Eleventh Amendment barred
federal jurisdiction.5 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded that decision for
further consideration. 5 ' The Sixth Circuit, in turn, remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to completely adjudicate the competing claims to the vessel.252
243 Id. at 509 (Stevens, J., concurring).
244 See id. at 510 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
245 See id.
246 See Bouchard Transp. Co., Inc. v. Updegraff, 147 F.3d 1344, 1349 (1 1th Cir. 1998),
cert. deniedsub nom. Department of Envtl. Protection of Fla. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 119
S. Ct. 1030 (1999).
247 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (1994) (permitting a vessel to limit its liability for oil spill cleanup
costs to $1200 per gross ton).
248 See Bouchard, 147 F.3d at 1348-51.
249 See id. at 1349.
250 See Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain
Lawrence, 105 F.3d 1078, 1083-84 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1091 (1998).
253 See Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain
Lawrence, 523 U.S. 1091 (1998).
252 See Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain
Lawrence, 177 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 1999).
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The Sixth Circuit called the Eleventh Amendment argument a "red herring" 253 and
clarified that there was no jurisdictional bar preventing the district court's
determination of the proper titleholder.24
CONCLUSION
The admiralty law of salvage developed to provide incentives to save lives and
find salvageable property.2" Over the years, treasure hunters have expended
enormous sums in attempts to find shipwrecks. If salvors had no hope of maintaining
significant awards from the salvage, many important historical artifacts might never
be found.256 States do not have the resources or the desire to search for vessels.257
If states did spend resources on treasure hunting, it possibly would be considered by
some as a gross misallocation of taxpayer money.
In deciding admiralty in rem cases, courts should base their analysis on the effect
of their judgments before allowing assertions of the Eleventh Amendment or
sovereign immunity. Those in rem actions that are actually in personam actions,
which are available at common law, should be given Eleventh Amendment
immunity."'
In cases in which the property in question is in the actual possession of the state
and is being used for a public or governmental purpose, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity would apply and the court would be precluded from enforcing ajudgment
against the government.5 9 In cases in which a court's arrest of the res would cause
253 Id. at 496.
254 See id. at 500. The Sixth Circuit also instructed the district court to require the state
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the vessel was abandoned before
awarding the state title under the ASA. See id. Subsequently, the district court held that The
Captain Lawrence had, indeed, been abandoned and vested title in the State of Michigan.
See Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Lawrence,
No. 2:94-CV-164, 1999 WL 1000204, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 2, 1999).
255 See MANGONE, supra note 13, at 201-04.
26 Arguably the most famous shipwreck of all time, the Titanic, would never have been
found but for the diligent efforts of salvors.
257 See McLaughlin, supra note 47, at 184 (noting that states were not expected to incur
any significant costs as a result of the ASA).
258 This supports the decision made by the Supreme Court in New York I, 256 U.S. 490
(1921), which was an inpersonam suit against Edward S. Walsh, Superintendent of Public
Works of the State of New York. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. Alternatively,
in the case of a suit by a citizen of the same state, the sovereign immunity doctrine
enunciated in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), would properly apply.
259 This is the proper basis for the decision in New York II, 256 U.S. 503 (1921). In New
York II, the tugboat Queen City was owned and operated by the city of New York and was
in its sole possession at the instigation of the action. See supra note 181 and accompanying
text. In New York II, there would have been no way for the court to enforce a judgment
without a direct conflict with the state.
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a "collision with the officer of the government," 260 the action would not be allowed
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In either instance, the plaintiff would
have to rely on remedies provided in state courts, such as tort or contract claims.26'
Alternatively, the plaintiff could allege, as the plaintiff did in Treasure Salvors, that
the officials were acting ultra vires or that the state had violated the Fifth
Amendment.262
However, if the property is properly within the possession of the court and the
state is merely asserting a claim, whether colorable or not, to property that is not in
its actual possession, a federal court must exercise the admiralty jurisdiction granted
to it by Article III of the United States Constitution.263 In the cases of shipwrecks
located in the waters off of a state, there is no bar to adjudication of the state's claims
by federal courts.2"
Allowing federal courts to determine the respective claims of various parties in
shipwreck cases would provide uniformity among the states and ensure proper
adjudication based on traditional maritime principles. Uniformity provides the
stability that is necessary for salvors to make considerable investment in time and
money to locate wrecks of historical importance.
MARK R. BAUMGARTNER
260 The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 21 (1869). Such a collision would occur, for
instance, if a state had its own research vessel working on archeological research at a wreck
site.
261 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
262 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use withoutjust compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
263 This reflects the view expressed in The Davis, in which cotton belonging to the
United States was subject to an in rem action that was filed before the United States gained
physical possession of the cotton. See The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 15; supra notes 156-
69 and accompanying text.
264 As recognized by the Court in Deep Sea, a shipwreck is not in the possessi6n of the
state even if it might be embedded. See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491,
498-99 (1998).
